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Abstract
It is usually stated that quantum mechanics presents problems with the identity of particles,
the most radical position -supported by E. Schro¨dinger- asserting that elementary particles
are not individuals. But the subject goes deeper, and it is even possible to obtain states
with an undefined particle number. In this work we present a set theoretical framework
for the description of undefined particle number states in quantum mechanics which pro-
vides a precise logical meaning for this notion. This construction goes in the line of solving a
problem posed by Y. Manin, namely, to incorporate quantum mechanical notions at the foun-
dations of mathematics. We also show that our system is capable of representing quantum
superpositions.
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1 Introduction
Quantum mechanics (QM) in both of its versions, relativistic and non-relativistic, is considered
as one of the most important physical theories of our time, giving rise to spectacular technological
developments and experimental predictions. Yet, interpretation of QM still gives rise to difficult
problems, which are far from finding a definitive solution. This is, perhaps, one of the most
interesting features of QM, and poses important philosophical questions. In particular, while
classical extensional mereology is widely investigated in important philosophical textbooks (see
for example [1] for a complete study), the development of a quantum mereology (i.e., a mereology
based on objects obeying the laws of QM) is still lacking. And this is an important issue
for ontological considerations, because it is expected that a quantum mereology will be quite
different than classical extensional mereology (at least, if we follow the standard interpretation
of QM and many other interpretations as well).
The development of formal systems in which mereological properties (or features) of a given
ontology are rigorously expressed is a helpful goal. This is the case in Les´niewski’s Mereology
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(based on his “Calculus of Names”) or the “Calculus of Individuals” of Leonard and Goodman
[1].
In this work we will develop a formal framework which captures important features of the
quantum formalism, namely,
• undefined particle number and
• undefined properties (as the ones appearing in quantum superpositions).
By capturing these quantum features, our system may be helpful for the task of developing a
quantum mereology in a rigorous way. This is an important issue for any philosopher interested
in the development of an ontology based on quantum mechanics.
We will present a construction which goes in the direction of solving a problem posed by
Y. Manin (see [2] for a complete discussion of Manin’s problem and an alternative proposal of
solution for it). In his words [3, 4]
“We should consider the possibilities of developing a totally new language to speak
about infinity. Set theory is also known as the theory of the ‘infinite’. Classical
critics of Cantor (Brouwer et al.) argued that, say, the general choice axiom is an
illicit extrapolation of the finite case.
I would like to point out that this is rather an extrapolation of common-place physics,
where we can distinguish things, count them, put them in some order, etc. New
quantum physics has shown us models of entities with quite different behavior. Even
‘sets’ of photons in a looking-glass box, or of electrons in a nickel piece are much less
Cantorian than the ‘set’ of grains of sand. In general, a highly probabilistic ‘physical
infinity’ looks considerably more complicated and interesting than a plain infinity of
‘things’.”[3]
Thus, Manin suggests the development of set theories [5, 6, 7, 8] incorporating the novel features
of quantum entities, which depart radically from our every day concepts1. In this line, many
alternatives where developed, most of them grounded in non-reflexive logics [9, 10]. In particular,
it is possible to incorporate in a Zermelo-Frenkel (ZF ) set theory the notion of quantum non-
individuality [2, 11, 12, 13, 14] and this was done by introducing indistinguishability “right at
the start” [15]. According to the interpretation of E. Schro¨dinger an elementary particle cannot
be considered as an individual entity
“I mean this: that the elementary particle is not an individual; it cannot be
identified, it lacks ‘sameness’. The fact is known to every physicist, but is rarely
given any prominence in surveys readable by nonspecialists. In technical language it
is covered by saying that the particles ‘obey’ a newfangled statistics, either Einstein-
Bose or Fermi-Dirac statistics. [...] The implication, far from obvious, is that the
unsuspected epithet ‘this’ is not quite properly applicable to, say, an electron, except
with caution, in a restricted sense, and sometimes not at all.” E. Schro¨dinger ([16],
p.197)
Similarly, Michael Redhead and Paul Teller claim in [17, 18] that:
1Although Manin has seemingly changed his position regarding this subject [5], the problem posed above still
seems interesting to us and we will take it as a basis for our work.
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“Interpreters of quantum mechanics largely agree that classical concepts do not
apply without alteration or restriction to quantum objects. In Bohr’s formulation
this means that one cannot simultaneously apply complementary concepts, such as
position and momentum, without restriction. In particular, this means that one
cannot attribute classical, well defined trajectories to quantum systems. But in a
more fundamental respect it would seem that physicists, including Bohr, continue to
think of quantum objects classically as individual things, capable, at least conceptu-
ally, of bearing labels. It is this presumption and its implications which we need to
understand and critically examine.” M. Redhead and P. Teller ([18], p.202)
It is important to mention that, besides the conception of quantum entities as non-individuals,
the validity of the principle of identity of indiscernibles (PII) in QM was also questioned (see for
example [2], [19] and [20]). PII can be written as follows: it is not possible for two individuals
to possess all the same attributes in common [19]. As remarked in [19], if quanta were not
individuals, “PII would not be either true or false, but simply inapplicable”. Thus, violation of
PII and non-individuality of quanta are not equivalent and should not be confused.
In the last years, a different perspective on the problem of quantum indistinguishability was
developed [21, 22]. In [23, 24] (see also [25]) it is claimed that according to quantum theory,
indistinguishable particles are not utterly indiscernible, but obey a weaker form of discernibility,
namely, weak discernibility. This weak form of discernment is achieved by a relational symmetric
and non reflexive relation between the relata. Different grades of discernibility in standard model
theory and its logical relations and links with philosophical problems are discussed in [26] and
[27] (see also [28]).
Though these works are very compelling, the success in their application to the problem
of distinguishability of elementary particles is far from being conclusive. In the first place,
the results presented in [23, 24] were criticized in [29]2, because the properties used to discern
(weakly) were unphysical, a perspective to which we adhere3. But the solution proposed in [29]
is not very attractive either: particles are weakly discerned by using an observable based on
their (squared) relative positions in space. But one may wonder how is it possible to discern
something in this way, given that it is widely known how difficult is to assign definite positions to
particles previous to any measurement. It seems that the only thing achieved here is numerical
distinctness of space-time points, something which in principle should not be equated with
discernibility of the particles involved (unless cumbersome interpretational moves are made)4.
A similar observation applies to observables different than position. Indeed, a similar problem
seems to appear in [25], where the case of two entangled bosons is discussed.
It may be argued that the relation of weak discernibility holding between two electrons, can
probably ensure that the number of objects is indeed two. But it seems that it falls short of
2In the Concluding remarks of [29], Caulton claims that the approaches of Muller, Saunders and Seevinck
“...have been seen to fail, due to their surreptitious use of mathematical predicates that can be given no physical
interpretation.”
3Similarly, in [32] it is claimed that (our emphasis): “All evidence points into the same direction: ‘identical
quantum particles’ behave like money units in a bank account rather than like Blackean spheres. It does not
matter what external standards we introduce, they will always possess the same relations to all (hypothetically
present) entities. The irreflexive relations used by Saunders and others to argue that identical quantum particles
are weakly discernible individuals lack the physical significance required to make them suitable for the job.”
4Related to this observation, see also [32] where a similar argument can be found for spins and the following
observation is made regarding position measurements in QM: “To see how this complicates matters, think of
a one-particle position measurement carried out on a many-particles system described by such a symmetrized
state. The result found in such a measurement (for example, the click of a Geiger counter or a black spot on a
photographic plate) is not linked to one of the ‘particle labels’; it is, in symmetrical fashion, linked to all of them.
This already demonstrates how the classical limit of quantum mechanics does not simply connect the classical
particle concept to individual indices in the quantum formalism”.
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separating them in such a way that they can be successfully identified. Indeed, in [30] it is
pointed out that:
“One sense of discerning involves recognizing some qualitative differences (whether
in the form of different properties or different relations) between the objects consid-
ered. When we discern objects in this sense, we should (at least in principle) be able
to pick out one of them but not the other. Being able to discern objects in that way
seems to be a prerequisite for making successful reference, or giving a unique name,
to each individual object. But by discerning we can also mean recognizing objects
as numerically distinct. In this sense of the word, discernment is a process by which,
using some qualitative features of the objects, we make sure that there are indeed
two entities and not one.”
In [31], the notion of witness-discernibility is used to argue against the use of weak discerni-
bility as a means to rehabilitate PII in QM. Even the very applicability of the notion of weak
discernibility in the quantum framework was criticized in [32]. Taking into account the different
criticisms mentioned above, the conclusion that weak discernibility entails a recovering of PII
and discernibility of quanta is too hasty. Put in the words of Dieks [32]:
“The analogy between quantum mechanical systems of “identical particles” and
classical collections of weakly discernible objects is only superficial. There is no
sign within standard quantum mechanics that “identical particles” are things at
all: there is no ground for the supposition that relations between the indices in
the formalism possess physical significance in the sense that they connect actual
objects. Consequently, the irreflexivity of these relations is not important either.
Conventional wisdom appears to have it right after all.”[32]
So, even if the approach based on weak discernibility could be developed in the future in order
to provide a more attractive solution to the problem of discerning elementary particles, none of
the results presented up to now is conclusive. The plausibility of non-individuals was defended
in [33, 34], the validity of PII was questioned in [35, 19, 20] and different criticisms against weak
discernibility are presented in [30, 31, 32, 36, 37, 38]. Furthermore, even from the perspective
of weak discernibility approach, quanta are not individuals in the sense that they cannot be
absolutely discerned by qualitative physical properties. In this way, the question regarding
individuality or non-individuality of quanta remains unsettled.
In a similar vein, the usual assumption that a definite particle number can be always obtained
was also criticized. This conclusion is grounded in the well known result that it is not possible
to assign in general, previous to measurement, definite values to observables in superposition
states [39]. Thus, a new turn of the Manin’s problem was presented in [40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45].
In this work we will follow the interpretation of QM which denies that quantum systems can
be always considered as singular unities (a quantum system as a “one”), or collections of them
(a quantum system as a “many”).
It is important to remark here that there are other interpretations which deny the existence
of systems with undefined particle number. In such interpretations, states which involve super-
positions with different particle number are usually interpreted as ordinary mixtures. Another
possibility may be to consider P. Teller’s notion of non-supervenient relations in order to describe
superpositions in particle number. Regarding this last possibility, we quote Teller [47]:
“Supervenience provides an attractive answer to this question, attractive because
the answer is consistent with the absence of explicit reductions or definitions of
the non-physical in terms of the physical. For example, a physicalist might claim
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that mental states supervene on brain or other bodily states, in the sense that two
physically identical bodily states would exhibit the same mental states, even though
these mental states might well not be definable in terms of the bodily states.”
We see that for Teller, the ‘attractiveness’ of the approach based on supervenience lies in the
fact that there can be no explicit reductions or definitions in terms of the relata. But from
the point of view of relational holism[47]5, it is plausible that there exist collections of objects
having physical relations which do not supervene on the non-relational physical properties of
the parts. This would be the case for entangled states in QM, such as those violating Bell’s
inequalities. By continuing this, one may try to explain states with undefined particle number as
a kind non-supervenient relation between the particles involved in the terms of the superposition.
But undefined particle number should not be confused with entanglement; it is an undefined
property of the system as a whole: the superposition describes a state of affairs in which one of
the properties of the whole collection is undefined, in this case, particle number. While undefined
particle number states may present non-local correlations (i.e., they violate some kind of Bell
inequality), these two effects should not be confused. This distinction suggests that undefined
particle number could not be described as a non-supervenient relational property between the
particles involved, simply because it is not a well defined property at all. These considerations
are very probably not sufficient to rule out a description of undefined particle number as a
non-supervenient relation, but this is not determinant for our concerns in this article.
Our interest in this work is not to settle the question about which is the correct interpretation.
We focus on the development of a framework for studying the consequences of assuming that
undefined particle number states actually exist. Notwithstanding, it is very important to remark
here that the formal framework presented in this work contains a copy of the standard approach
to mathematics (see Section 3.1). This implies that any mereological construction which can
be attained in a standard set theoretical framework can also be attained with ours. Thus, our
mereological framework has the advantage of being able to cope with different interpretations of
quantum phenomena. In particular, the approaches of Muller and Saunders [23, 24] or a possible
description of superpositions in particle number in terms of non-supervenient relations (in case
they can be accommodated within standard formal frameworks) can be perfectly described in
our framework.
The considerations mentioned above point in the direction that a non-standard mereology is
worth to be developed. Firstly, because metaphysical underdetermination does not single out
a unique interpretation for quantum theory, and as we have mentioned above, the different
alternatives remain inconclusive. In particular, the standard interpretation of QM —asserting
that superpositions represent states of affairs in which no definite values can be assigned to the
superposed property— remains strong. Secondly, because in order to discuss about different
interpretations, it is important to have at hand formal frameworks in order to cope with them,
trying to capture (or to describe) in a precise (rigorous) way the essence of the intuitive notions
involved. Thus, we present here a mereological framework powerful enough to describe different
interpretations of the quantum formalism oriented to the problem of undefined particle number.
We will face the problems linked to undefined particle number and -going in the line of the
Manin’s problem- we will develop a formal set theoretical framework capable of incorporating
such a quantum mechanical feature. We will also see that our framework is capable of describing
undefined properties arising from quantum superpositions. This is the reason why our system
could be considered as a solution to a generalization of the problem possed by Manin (see also [2]
for an alternative solution considering non-individuality of quanta). We believe that the formal
setting presented in this work could be a concrete step —for interpretational purposes— to give
5See also [48] and [49] for a development of this notion and the problems posed by Teller.
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a precise logical meaning to what is meant by “undefined particle number” by incorporating
this notion into a set theoretical framework. And also that it constitutes in itself an interesting
structure for the possible development of new non-standard mathematics, which in turn, could
be the basis for new formal frameworks with potential applications to physics. As an example
of this procedure see [45]. At the same time, the developments presented in this work constitute
a concrete step in order to develop a quantum mereology.
Before entering into the content of the article, it is important to mention that there is
another important branch of formal developments induced by quantum mechanics, namely, a
vast family of quantum logics. Since the seminal paper of Birkhoff and von Newmann [50],
several investigations were motivated in the fields of logic, algebraic logic, and the foundations
of physics. Besides these developments, some authors have claimed that according to the logical
structure of QM, we should abandon classical logic (see for example [51]). On the other hand,
the nowadays dominant interpretation of the quantum logical formalism developed by Birkhoff
and von Neumann considers it as the study of algebraic structures linked to QM, and by no
means is considered as an alternative to classical logic. Notwithstanding, it is important to
remark that there are several examples of modifications of classical logic in the following sense.
Even if it is a subtle matter to define exactly what classical logic is, it is possible to consider it
as having two levels:
• 1) an elementary level, which is essentially first order predicate calculus, with or without
identity, and
• 2) a non elementary level, which could be a set theory, a category theory, or a theory of
logical types.
It is then possible to modify level 2 in order to develop a family of logics which can be
considered non-classical. Indeed, the system presented in this paper in non-classical in the sense
mentioned above. It is also possible to modify level 1, as shown in [52]. Of course, the existence
of these possibilities does not suffices to settle the question about the adequacy or non adequacy
of classical logic. Thought we will not discuss this subject in detail in this paper, we remark
that it is a matter of fact that the influence of QM in the development of formal systems gave
rise to a considerable proliferation of investigations [53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64,
65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72], including the development of “quantum set theories” [73, 74].
The article is organized as follows. In section 2, we discuss the meaning of superpositions
of particle number eigenstates in Fock-space, introducing the interpretation which supports the
existence of undefined particle number states6. In section 3 we present the preliminary notions of
our set theoretical framework by introducing its specific axioms. After doing this, we are ready
to show how our framework solves the problem of incorporating undefined particle number
in section 4, and also that it is capable of describing quantum superpositions. We will also
present in this Section some special features of our axiomatic and general remarks about our
construction, which could be useful for further developments. Finally, we pose our conclusions
in 5.
2 Undefined particle number: an overview
QFT requires an understanding of states with no definite particle number and, as explained
above, we shall attempt to construct a formal framework accommodating that notion. In order
that a superposition of states with different particle number occur, it is necessary to have a
6The Fock-space formulation is also discussed with great detail in [2], Chapter 9. See also [45] and [46].
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space which includes states with different particle number. This is provided by the Fock-Space
formalism (FSF ). The FSF is used, for example, in the second quantization formalism, and we
find a version of it both in relativistic and non-relativistic quantum mechanics. It can be shown
that the FSF may be used as an alternative approach to non relativistic quantum mechanics
[76]. This can be seen by using the heuristic approach presented in elementary expositions like
[81, 76] (but see for example [80], [77] and [78] for a mathematically rigorous presentation). For
an important introduction to the philosophical problems of quantum field theory (in which the
FSF and particle number superpositions are discussed) we refer to [79].
We will concentrate here on coherent states of the electromagnetic field in order to make the
exposition simpler. But it is important to remark that there are other more involved examples
of undetermined particle number, as is the case of Rindler quanta [80] or the BCS state of
Bose-Einstein condensates [81], but we will not treat them here.
The second quantization approach to QM has its roots in considering the Schro¨dinger’s
equation as a classical field equation, and its solution Ψn(r1, . . . , rn) as a classical field to be
quantized. This alternative view was originally adopted by P. Jordan [82, 83], one of the foun-
dation fathers of quantum mechanics, and spread worldwide after the Dirac’s paper [84]. And it
is a standard way of dealing with relativistic quantum mechanics (canonical quantization). The
space in which these quantized fields operate is the Fock-space.
It is important to remark that the n particle Schro¨dinger wave equation is not completely
equivalent to its analogue in the Fock-space formalism. Only solutions of the Fock-space equation
which are eigenvectors of the particle number operator with particle number n can be solutions
of the corresponding n particle Schro¨dinger wave equation. And the other way around, not all
the solutions of the n particle Schro¨dinger wave equation can be solutions of the Fock equation,
only those which are symmetrized do. Then, both conditions, definite particle number and
symmetrization, must hold in order that both formalisms yield equivalent predictions.
The hamiltonian of the mth mode of a quantized electromagnetic field can be written in
terms of the creation and annihilation operators a†k and ak as follows
Hn = ~ω(a
†
kak +
1
2
) (1)
and so, each a†m (am) creates (annihilates) a photon in mode m. Then, a fock space state (with
definite particle number) can be expressed as
|n1, n2, . . . , nm, . . .〉 = |n1〉 ⊗ |n2〉 ⊗ . . .⊗ |nm〉 ⊗ . . . (2)
with ni the number of photons present in each mode of the field. If for simplicity we concentrate
in only one frequency mode of the field, we can create any normalized superposition of states,
and in particular, the famous coherent state
|z〉 = exp(−
1
2
|z|2)
∞∑
n=0
zn
(n!)
1
2
|n〉 (3)
which can be realized in laboratory [81]. State (3) is clearly a superposition of different photon
number states and thus is not an eigenstate of the particle number operator. It follows that,
according to the standard interpretation, it represents a physical system formed by an undefined
number of photons. It is important to remark that there are -at least- two interpretations of (3)
• 1-Equation (3) represents an statistical mixture of states with definite particle number.
• 2-Equation (3) represents an state which has no definite particle number.
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The orthodox interpretation of QM points in the direction of the second option and the first one is
very difficult to sustain unless involved hypotheses are made [39]. Regardless the interpretational
debate, it will suffice for us that there exists at least one interpretation compatible with quantum
mechanics in which particle number is undefined. Thus, given that systems in states like (3)
are predicted by QM and can indeed be reproduced in the laboratory, we are going to propose
below a formalism in order to incorporate physical systems in such states in a set theoretical
framework.
3 Preliminaries and primitive symbols
We will work with a variant of Zermelo-Frenkel (ZF ) set theory [8] with physical things (PTs).
We will denote this theory by ZF ∗. The underlying logic of ZF ∗ is the classical first order
predicate calculus with equality (identity). The primitive symbols of ZF ∗ are the following
• Those of classical first order predicate calculus using only identity and the membership
symbol “∈”
• the unary predicate symbol “C() . . .” (such that “C(x)” reads “x is a set”)
• a binary predicate symbol “⊏” whose meaning will be clear below, when we give the
general mereological axioms used in our framework
ZF ∗ concerns sets and PTs (which are not sets), and so, it is involved with a kind of mereology.
PTs are meant to represent physical objects. Depending on the particular interpretation of
our framework, PTs may represent fields, particles, strings or any collection of physical objects
whose interpretation is compatible with the ontology intended for our framework. In particular,
we will consider the system represented by a state such as the one of (3), as formed by an
undefined number of photons.
Definitions of formulas, sentences (formulas without free variables), bound variables, free
variables, etc., are the standard ones. As usual, we write “∃Cx(F (x))” instead of “∃x(C(x) ∧
F (x))” and “∀Cx(F (x))” instead of “∀x(C(x) −→ F (x))”.
ZF ∗ possesses axioms of two different kinds: the ones concerned with sets and the ones
concerned with PTs. Let us begin by listing the set theoretical axioms.
3.1 Set theoretical axioms
The following postulates constitute an adaptation of those of Zermelo-Frenkel set theory (see
[8] for details).
Axiom 3.1 (Extensionality).
(∀Cx)(∀Cy)((∀z)(z ∈ x←→ z ∈ y) −→ x = y)
Axiom 3.2 (Union).
(∀x)(∀y)(∃Ct)(∀z)(z ∈ t←→ (z ∈ x ∨ z ∈ y))
Axiom 3.3 (Power set).
(∀Cx)(∃Cy)(∀Ct)(t ∈ y ←→ t ⊆ x)
If F (x) is a formula, x, y and z are distinct variables and y does not occur free in F (x), we have
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Axiom 3.4 (Separation).
(∀Cz)(∃Cy)(∀x)(x ∈ y ←→ F (x) ∧ x ∈ z)
Axiom 3.5 (Empty set).
(∃Ct)(∀x)(x /∈ t)
Axiom 3.6 (Amalgamation).
(∀Cx)((∀y)(y ∈ x −→ C(y)) −→ (∃Cz)(∀t)(t ∈ z ←→ (∃v)(v ∈ x ∧ t ∈ v)))
If F (x, y) is a formula and the variables satisfy evident conditions we have:
Axiom 3.7 (Replacement).
(∀x)(∃!y)(F (x, y)) −→ (∀Cu)(∃Cv)(∀y)(y ∈ v ←→ (∃x)(x ∈ u ∧ F (x, y)))
Axiom 3.8 (Infinity).
(∃Cz)(∅ ∈ z ∧ (∀x)(x ∈ z −→ x ∪ {x} ∈ z))
Axiom 3.9 (Choice).
(∀Cx){(∀y)(y ∈ x −→ C(y)) ∧ (∀y)(∀z)(y ∈ x ∧ z ∈ x −→ (y ∩ z = ∅ ∧ y 6= ∅))
−→ (∃Cu)(∀y)(∃v)(y ∈ x −→ (y ∩ u = {v}))}
Axiom 3.10 (Foundation).
(∀Cx)(x 6= ∅ ∧ (∀y)(y ∈ x −→ C(y))) −→ (∃z)(z ∈ x ∧ z ∩ x = ∅)
3.2 Axioms for PTs
Now we list the axioms for PTs. We will use small Greek letters for variables restricted to PTs.
Informally, the symbol “⊏” will express the “being part of” relation. Thus, “α ⊏ β” means that
“α and β are PTs and α is a part of β”. We start with some preliminary definitions.
Definition 3.11 (Disjointness).
α|β := ¬∃γ(γ ⊏ α ∧ γ ⊏ β)
α|β is interpreted as “α and β are PTs which share no part in common”; a possible definition
of indistinguishability could be given as follows (though we will not use it in this work)
Definition 3.12 (Indiscernibility).
α ≡ β := α ⊏ β ∧ β ⊏ α
α ≡ β means that α and β are indistinguishable, in the sense that they cannot be discerned by
any physical means.
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Definition 3.13 (PT).
T (x) := ¬C(x)
T (x) reads “x is not a set”, and thus, it is a PT.
Definition 3.14 (Sum of parts).
S(x, α) := C(x) ∧ ∀y(y ∈ x −→ T (y)) −→ ∀γ(γ|α←→ ∀β(β ∈ x −→ β|γ))
The explanation of S(x, α) is that if x is a set such that all its elements are PTs, then for every
γ which satisfies being disjoint to α, then it will also be disjoint to any element β in x and
viceversa. Intuitively, the only PT α which has this property is the physical sum of all the PTs
belonging to x.
We now formulate a general axiomatic for PTs. These axioms may encompass a general
class of entities, ranging from field quanta to non relativistic particles. But it is important to
remark that all these entities need more specific axioms in order to be fully characterized; we
are concentrating here in their general mereological porperties.
We start by stating that every thing is a part of itself
Axiom 3.15.
(∀α)(α ⊏ α)
It is reasonable to assume transitivity of the relationship “⊏”
Axiom 3.16.
(∀α)(∀β)(∀γ)(α ⊏ β ∧ β ⊏ γ −→ α ⊏ γ)
We will postulate that there exists the sum of any non empty set of PTs
Axiom 3.17.
(∀x)(∃α)(S(x, α))
4 Things with undefined number of parts
We will use the following notation
Definition 4.1.
∃{x |F (x)} := (∃y)(∀x)(x ∈ y ←→ F (x))
and the following definition will allow us to present a possible solution to the problem posed in
Section 1
Definition 4.2.
Cant(α) := ∃{β |β ⊏ α}
If Cant(α) we will say that α is Cantorian7. The above definition says that if a PT α is
cantorian, then, all parts of α form a set (and vice versa). Thus, it is possible to assign a
cardinal to any Cantorian thing α by assigning a cardinal number to its set of parts in the usual
way (using choice axiom 3.9). Notice that it is straightforward to show that if α is Cantorian,
then there exists only one set satisfying the equality of definition 4.2.
For any x such that C(x), denote ♯(x) the cardinal assigned in the usual way using the ZF
axiomatic (and we can use it for sets, because the axiomatic of ZF ∗ includes that of ZF ). Thus
we define
7We use “Cantorian” in analogy with the system NF of Quine [87, 88]. But this should not lead to any
confusion: the analogy is not too deep.
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Definition 4.3. If Cant(α), let z be the only set satisfying the equality of definition 4.2. Then
we define the cardinal of α (abreviated as ♯(α)) as
♯(α) := ♯(z)
Any PT α will be cantorian or not. If α is not Cantorian (i.e., if ¬(Cant(α))), then, there is no
means for ensuring that its parts form a set using the above axioms. Because of this, there is no
way in which we can assign to α a cardinal using ZF axioms, and from this point of view, it is
reasonable to interpret a non Cantorian PT as having no cardinal. In this way, we find that the
axiomatic framework presented in this work is useful to represent PTs with undefined number
of constituents as the ones presented in section 2. But once this general solution is presented,
new problems may be posed. We list them below:
1. We provided a general axiomatic for PTs. But it is clear that each theory and spatio-
temporal setting will have its own and characteristic ontological features implying its
particular axiomatic. Which should be the specific axioms for non relativistic quantum
mechanics and relativistic quantum mechanics respectively?
2. How to represent a physical thing which is in a superposition state like the one represented
by equation (3)?
3. How to represent a physical superposition in general?
4. Related to (1) and (2), how to represent entanglement?
In this work, we presented a possible solution for question 2. Systems formed of an undefined
particle number are represented by non-cantorian things. But -up to now- our formalism does
not distinguishes the state a1|n〉+a2|m〉 from a
′
1
|n〉+a′
2
|m〉 (with a′
1
6= a1 or a
′
2
6= a2). In future
works, we will essay possible solutions for the problems posed above.
Notwithstanding, something can be said about superpositions using non-cantorian sets right
now (thus providing a partial answer to question 3). The following construction, shows that
non-cantorian sets possess unexpected properties, which are capable to yield non-standard math-
ematics and can represent physical situations at the same time. Suppose that α is such that
¬(Cant(α)). Then, given a formula F (x), it is impossible –with the above axioms– to grant the
existence of the set
αF = {β ⊏ α |F (β)} (4)
The separation axiom cannot be applied, because the parts of α do not conform necessarily a set!
But in a standard set theory (like ZF ), “properties” are usually expressed as the membership
to given set. For example, if we want to state that the number 4 is even, we can express this by
the formula 4 ∈ {x ∈ N | ∃y(x = 2 × y ∧ y ∈ N)}. But if we want to interpret our formula F (x)
as representing a physical property in ZF ∗ (defined by extension as the set of all PTs possessing
that property), we will face a problem. We cannot grant the existence of the set formed by the
parts of α possessing the property defined by F (x). This is a direct consequence of ¬(Cant(α)).
This situation could be interpreted as follows: “if α is not Cantorian, we cannot assert that
its parts possess the property defined by F (x) or that they do not possess it”. This fact, does
not constitutes a real problem for our framework, but an unexpected advantage: this kind of
undetermination in the possession of a property can be interpreted as being in a superposition
state. Indeed, a key feature of a quantum mechanical superposition is the lack of meaning in
asserting or denying the possession of a given property.
When we face a superposition —say, in a system of spin 1
2
— such as 1√
2
(| ↑〉 + | ↓〉), we
are not capable of asserting that the system has spin up nor spin down: this is a key aspect
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of superpositions, captured by our framework. Thus, our framework is also capable of giving a
precise logical meaning to superpositions (at least of a special kind). In order to make thinks
clearer, think of α as formed by the photons of a state of the electro magnetic field such as (3).
As it is a superposition in particle number, its energy is also undefined, and thus, the set of
photons possessing a definite energy value will inherit the non-Cantorianity of α.
Taking into account the above discussions, it would be interesting to provide a definition of
what should be considered classical and quantum PTs within our framework. We give definitions
below trying to capture such notions.
Definition 4.4 (Irreducible Part).
I(α, β) := α ⊏ β ∧ (∀γ)(γ ⊏ α −→ γ ≡ α)
I(α, β) will be interpreted as “α is an irreducible part of β”, and this means that α is a part
of β and that any part of α will be indistinguishable of α itself. It is straightforward to show
that if α is cantorian, then there exists the set of all irreducible parts (hint: use separation).
We remark that this set may be the empty set. Now we will define the important notions of
classical part and quantum part with respect to a well formed formula F (x). If α is a PT and
F (x) is a formula, we define
Definition 4.5. CantF (α) := ∃{β ⊏ α |F (β)}
If CantF (α) we will say that α has a cantorian subset of parts satisfying F (x). If ¬CantF (α), we
will interpret this as: “some parts of α are in a superposition state with respect to the property
F (x)”. Thus, given a formula F (x), we will say that
Definition 4.6 (Quantum Part).
QPF (α) := ¬CantF (α)
and interpret this as: “α is quantal with respect to F (x)”.
Definition 4.7 (Classical Part).
CPF (α) := CantF (α)
and interpret this as: “α is classical with respect to F (x)”.
We conclude this Section by adding a list of general remarks which could be useful to consider
in further developments of a mereology involving quantum entities.
1. As remarked above, different axioms could be added to the above framework in order
to capture different kinds of PTs. The specific form of these axioms will depend on the
particular physical theory but also -and strongly- on the interpretation of that theory.
2. It should be clear that the spatio-temporal setting in which the theory is developed (v.g.,
Galilean space time for non-relativistic quantum mechanics and Minkowski space-time
for QFT) have a crucial influence in the mereological properties of the corresponding
physical objects. This implies that, in order to develop a more specific framework, axioms
containing specific space time notions should be added to the axiomatic presented in this
work.
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3. We may represent a general physical system as a triplet < P,M,S >, where P is a set
representing PTs, M is the corresponding space-time differential manifold of the theory
and S is a mathematical structure involving mathematical objects, some of which are built
with the help of M . For example, non-relativistic quantum mechanics may be represented
as a set, endowed with Galilean manifold and the axiomatic of von Neumann written in
the mathematical language of functional analysis. A unitary transformation will thus be
a mathematical concept linked to the space-time notion of Galilean symmetry transfor-
mation. It is important to remark that the explicit inclusion of the space time manifold,
while necessary for experimental verification of the theory, does not implies necessarily
that the entities involved has well defined spatio-temporal properties, as is the case in the
orthodox interpretation of QM.
4. It is easy to show that if in our system there are Cantorian sets, then, the totality for PTs
will not be a set.
5. If one wants to quit identity of our system (in order to consider indistinguishable objects
as in [2]), it suffices replace identity “=” for a new symbol “≡”, postulating that it is an
equivalence relation with extra conditions (chosen in a suitable way in order to capture
the desired physical features).
In future works, we will address these questions by developing a new system, namely Z∗∗,
capable of incorporating all these features, and thus, providing a complete quantum mereology.
The development of a quantum mereology is still an open problem, and the formal framework
presented here is a concrete step in this direction. In particular, the formal approach to quantum
features of our system is not present in previous mereological discussions (as for example, in
[1, 85, 86]).
5 Conclusions
In this work we presented a solution for what can be considered a generalization of the Manin’s
problem, namely, the problem of incorporating in a set theoretical framework the quantum me-
chanical notion of undefined particle number. Furthermore, our system recovers the interesting
feature of possessing undefined properties representing quantum superpositions. Although our
proposal is a valid solution for the problems posed in [40, 41, 42, 43, 44], a lot of questions
arise and remain unsolved. In particular, it would be interesting to search for other axiomatic
systems capturing quantum entanglement.
By incorporating these quantum features, our framework is a concrete step for the devel-
opment of a rigorous quantum mereology. This is an important issue for those philosophers
interested in the development of any ontology which takes quantum mechanics as a fundamental
theory.
Of course, many other constructions could be envisaged, and they may depend on the par-
ticular interpretation of the quantum formalism. For example, it would be interesting to look
for the specific implications that the spatio-temporal setting has for the mereological axiomatic
capturing the properties of the physical systems of different theories. In particular, a quantum
relativistic and non-relativistic mereology is lacking, and we think that the development of set
theoretical frameworks like the one presented in this work could be useful for that purpose.
The characterization of undefined particle number and more general quantum superpositions
presented in this work, could be used in different –and perhaps, more sophisticated– frameworks.
We note that the proposed logical system presented in this paper can be used as a basis for all
non relativistic quantum mechanics; we shall discuss this question in a forthcoming paper.
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Another interesting question to look at would be that of the implications for mathematics
of systems like the one presented here. How would it be a mathematics not based on our every
day concepts, but on quantum mechanics? Such a question was partially answered [2], but our
system opens a new door to such a research program. In particular, the system presented above,
constitutes a novel example of non-standard mathematics, which gives a precise logical meaning
to the –up to now– intuitive notion of what physicists mean by “undefined particle number”.
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